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INTRODUCTION

"Unions Lose as High Court Backs Companies In Bankruptcy
Filings" 1 was a front page headline of the February 23, 1984 New
York Times. The accompanying newspaper text announced the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Local 408 of the InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Bildisco & Bildisco2 permitting a debtor in possession in a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code' to reject unilaterally existing collective-bargaining agreements. The decision was characterized in the article as a
"sharp setback for organized labor.""
Organized labor reacted aggressively by stalling imminent congressional action on the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal
Judgeship Act of 1984.1 A compromise was eventually reached in
1. New York Times, February 23, 1984, at 1.
2. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 30-59 and accompanying text.
3. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-151326 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985) [hereinafter "Code"]. The Code
is a part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 [hereinafter "BRA of 1978"], the first major revision of the bankruptcy laws since 1938. The BRA of
1978 consolidated three reorganization chapters of the predecessor act into a single business
reorganization chapter so that business reorganizations could be completed more rapidly
and efficiently while providing greater protection to the debtor, creditors, and the public
interest. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 5966.
The various chapters of title 11 are referred to by their code chapter numbers 1, 3, 5, 7, 9,
11, 13, and 15, 101-109, §§ 301-365, §§ 501-554 (now -559), §§ 701-766, §§ 901-946, §§ 11011174, §§ 1301-1330, §§ 1501-151326 respectively.
4. See supra note 1.
5. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, P.L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 [hereinafter the "Act"]. The Act was signed by President Reagan on July 10,
1984. The House Conference Report 98-882, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) does not contain a
joint explanatory statement by the Senate and House Judiciary Committees. Individual
committee members, however, delivered explanatory statements which are found in the
June 29, 1984 Congressional Record. Relevant comments in such statements are referred to
in this article.
The 1984 amendments to Title 11 of the United States Code appear only in the United
States Code Annotated (West). For the ease of the reader, all references to Title 11 will be
made to U.S.C.A.
The impetus for the Act was the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), wherein the Court ruled that the
jurisdiction granted to bankruptcy court judges by the BRA of 1978 with respect to adjudication of claims arising under state law violated the United States Constitution. Marathon
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June of 1984, whereby executory collective-bargaining agreements
were removed from the operation of the rejection provisions found
in section 365 of the Codes and treated separately in a new Code
section 1113.1
Was the Court's action (and the congressional reaction) in fact a
"sharp setback" for labor? This article will review bankruptcy law
and the Bildisco case, probe some of the more significant issues
section 1113 presents, and conclude with an examination of
whether the pendulum is indeed swinging against labor.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

Bankruptcy Law: An Overview

Two types of bankruptcy proceedings are available to a commercial business: liquidation and reorganization. Liquidation, governed
by Chapter 7, 8 involves the collection and liquidation of the
debtor's assets and the distribution of the proceeds to its creditors.
Reorganization, governed by Chapter 11, 9 involves the continued
operation of the business under court supervision. Under Chapter
11 reorganization the debtor, designated a "debtor in possession,"10
is discussed more fully in the text accompanying notes 179-86.
6. Subsection 365(a) of the Code states:
(a) Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsections (b), (c),
and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.
11 U.S.C.A. § 365(a) (1982).
Section 365 of the Code is based on the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sections 70b (Chapter
VII), 116(1) (Chapter X), and 313(1) (Chapter XI).
While the Code does not define "executory contract," the legislative history of section 365
states that the term "generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to
some extent on both sides." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6303; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 58 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5844. The courts have
uniformly followed the definition of Professor Vern Countryman who defines an executory
contract as one "under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party are so
far unperformed that the failure of either to complete the performance would constitute a
material breach excusing the performance of the other." Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy (Part1), 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).
See the discussion at notes 22-26 regarding the section 365 rejection process.
7. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113 (West Supp. 1985). Collective-bargaining agreements were removed from section 365 of the Code by section 541 of the Act. Section 541(c) of the Act
provides that the new section 1113 does not apply to cases filed under Title 11 which were
commenced prior to the enactment of section 541.
8. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-766 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
9. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
10. Id. §§ 1101(1) (West 1979) and 1107(a) (West Supp. 1985). Section 1101(1) provides: "(a) 'debtor in possession' means debtor except when a person that has qualified
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is given a period of time during which debt-collection efforts are
stayed1 1 and a repayment plan (i.e., the reorganization plan) can
be proposed.1 2 Both liquidation and reorganization may be initiated voluntarily by the debtor"s or involuntarily by a group of the
debtor's creditors.14 The proceedings may be converted from one
type to the other by the debtor, upon a creditor's petition, or the
court on its own motion."
If the debtor cannot satisfy the claims of all creditors as well as
the costs of the proceedings in either liquidation or a reorganization proceeding, it is required to make an equitable distribution of
assets among its creditors. Secured creditors are paid first to the
extent of the value of their interest in the particular collateral.' 6
Certain unsecured claims are paid in accordance with certain priority rules set forth in the Code, 17 and are given one of six priorities.18 Administrative expenses are given first priority1 9 and up to
$2,000 of wages earned by each individual within ninety days
before the petition's filing are given third priority.'0 Unsecured
claims outside of the Code's specified categories are considered
general claims for which the Code provides no priority. Thus, the
amount and timing of a creditor's recovery will vary with the priority given to its claim.'1
under section 322 of this title is serving as trustee in the case." Id.
Section 1107, "Rights, powers, and duties of debtor in possession," provides that the legal
status of the debtor in possession is comparable to that of a trustee in bankruptcy, although
not identical. Under circumstances where the debtor either cannot be or is not the appropriate party to operate the business, a trustee may be appointed to operate the business instead of the debtor. Id. § 1104 (West 1979). The debtor in possession is responsible for filing
a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and liabilities, a statement of the debtor's financial
affairs, and a reorganization plan, and is accountable for all property received and for evaluating proofs of claims. Id. § 1106. For purposes of this article, the term "debtor" will refer
both to a "debtor in possession" and to a "trustee in bankruptcy" operating the business of
the debtor.
11. Id. § 362, as amended by section 441 of the Act.
12. Id. §§ 1121-1129.
13. Id. § 301 (West 1979). The restrictions on who may become a debtor are minimal.

Id. § 109.
14. Id. § 303 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985). Creditors must satisfy several requirements to
commence an involuntary case, and the debtor may contest the creditor's petition.
15. Id. §§ 706, 1112.
16. Id. § 506, as amended by section 448 of the Act.
17. Id. § 507. See id. § 103(a) for rules which are applicable to both liquidation and
reorganization proceedings.
18. Id. § 507(a)(1)-(6), as amended by section 449 of the Act.
19. Id. § 507(a)(1).
20. Id. § 507(a)(3).
21. In a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7, all debts in each priority class must
be paid in full before the debtor can distribute anything to the next priority class, 11
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Bankruptcy courts are empowered to allow debtors to reject executory contracts.2 2 For most executory contracts, other than collective-bargaining agreements, the court need only determine that,
according to the business judgment rule, rejection will benefit the
estate. 23 The Code deems a rejected contract to be breached as of
the day b~fore the petition for reorganization was filed.24 Claims
for damages resulting from the rejection, including those for lost
future earnings, are general nonpriority claims.2 5 If a debtor assumes2 6 or enters into a contract during reorganization, or neither
assumes nor rejects an executory contract but does receive benefits
under it, then any claim arising under the contract during the reorganization period, including a claim related to a rejection after the
U.S.C.A. § 726(a)(1) (West 1979), and all priority claims must be satisfied before the general, unsecured creditors receive payment. Id. § 726(a)(2). In a reorganization proceeding
under Chapter 11, after secured claims are paid, all first and second priority claims must be
paid, in cash, by the debtor on the effective date of the plan. Id. § 1129(a)(9)(A). Third,
fourth, fifth and sixth priority claims may be paid as deferred cash payments. Id. §
1129(a)(9)(B) and (C). General, nonpriority claims are subject to impairment, id. § 1124,
which may involve deferment or outright cancellation of the claim. Id. §§ 1122, 1123(a)(3).
22. Id. § 365(a). For the text of this section and a discussion of the term "executory
contract," see supra note 6. In Chapter 11 proceedings, the debtor may assume or reject an
executory contract at any time prior to, or as a part of, the bankruptcy court's confirmation
of the plan of reorganization in accordance with 11 U.S.C.A. § 1123(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
Id. § 365(d)(2). In Chapter 7 proceedings, the trustee must assume or reject an executory
contract or unexpired lease within sixty days after the order for relief; otherwise, the contract or lease is deemed rejected by operation of law. Id. § 365(d)(1). If the debtor neither
assumes nor rejects the contract, the other party may apply to the court for an order directing that the contract be assumed or rejected within a reasonable period of time. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168 (1941).
23. Under the "business judgment" rule, a debtor may reject any executory contract if
such rejection is in good faith and benefits the estate, even if the contract is profitable or
generally beneficial and regardless of whether the contract is otherwise burdensome or its
rejection is economically justified or causes injury to other parties. In re Chi-Feng Huang,
23 Bankr. 798 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Ateco Equipment, 18 Bankr. 915 (W.D. Pa. 1982). See
also Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 318
U.S. 523, 550 (1943).
24. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(g)(1) (West 1979).
25. Id. §§ 365(g)(1), 502(c) (West Supp. 1985) and (g) (West 1979), and 507 (West
1979 & Supp. 1985). Proofs of claims for damages relating to such rejection are to be
presented through the normal bankruptcy administration process by which claims are estimated and classified, and, if such claims are not so presented, they are lost when a plan of
reorganization is confirmed. Id. §§ 501, 502 and 1141. Actions on claims that have been or
could have been brought before the filing of the bankruptcy petition are, with limited exceptions, stayed due to the automatic stay provisions of the Code. Id. § 362(a). Cf. Countryman,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy (Part2), 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 533, 536, 541 (1974).
26. 11 U.S.C.A. § 365(g)(2) (West 1979). If such a debtor elects to assume the executory contract, it assumes the whole contract, with all of its terms and conditions, and the
expenses and liabilities incurred post-petition and pre-acceptance are to be treated as administrative expenses. Id. § 503(b)(1)(A).
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contract has been accepted, is given first priority as a cost of
administration.
A Chapter 11 debtor often views its existing collective-bargaining agreement as a major cause of its poor financial predicament,
particularly if engaged in labor intensive businesses," or where involved as a defendant in a mass tort case." Prior to the enactment
of section 1113, when a debtor sought bankruptcy court approval
for the rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement pursuant to
the Code's section 365, three legal issues had to be resolved: (1)
whether collective-bargaining agreements are executory contracts
which may be rejected pursuant to section 365(a); (2) if so,
whether the ordinary business judgment rule used for other executory contracts was the applicable standard for rejection; and (3) if
the debtor unilaterally modified (or terminated) the agreement
post-petition and pre-approval by the bankruptcy court, whether
the debtor was guilty of an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 9 These issues were addressed
and answered by the Supreme Court in Bildisco.
B.

TEAMSTERS

v.

BILDISCO

&

BILDISCO30

On April 14, 1980 Bildisco & Bildisco (Bildisco), a New Jersey
general partnership in the business of distributing building supplies, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Code and was subsequently authorized by
the bankruptcy court to operate the business as a debtor in
27. Such a debtor usually believes that certain cost-related matters, such as wage
scales, health and welfare benefits, pension fund contributions, and vacation, funeral and
sick leave, unreasonably balloon its operating costs and are significantly greater than those
of its competitor's (and often unorganized) workforce. See, e.g., In re Blue Ribbon Transp.
Co., 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3505 (1983); In re Brada Miller Freight Systems, 702 F.2d 890
(11th Cir. 1983). Often, the debtor feels that certain provisions of the agreement, particularly the seniority provisions, keep it from operating in an efficient, cost effective manner or
from instituting improvements to its operations. See, e.g., In re Southern Electronics Co., 23
Bankr. 348 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). Occasionally, the debtor desires to get rid of a union it dislikes. See, e.g., In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
28. Sometimes a debtor, faced with a threat of an imposing contingent liability resulting from mass tort litigation, may believe that the present collective-bargaining agreement is
too costly in the context of the expected costs of the litigation and resulting damage awards.
See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). For a discussion of the
use of Chapter 11 in the mass tort situation, see generally Note, The Manville Reorganization, 48 ALB. L. REv. 1045 (1984); Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 846
(1984).
29. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
30. 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984).
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possession.3

At the time the petition was filed, approximately forty to fortyfive percent of Bildisco's employees were represented by Local 408
of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (the Union), which had negotiated a three year collective-bargaining agreement with Bildisco.
The agreement was due to expire in April, 1982 and was expressly
binding on the parties and their successors even though bankruptcy should supervene.3 2 Bildisco failed to meet some of its obligations under the agreement, including payments of health and
pension benefits, remittances to the Union of dues collected, and
wage increases called for in the agreement.33 Bildisco requested
and received permission from the bankruptcy court to reject the
agreement under section 365(a) of the Code.. 4 The district court
upheld the bankruptcy court's order and the Union appealed to
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.3 5
The Union filed unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), which found that Bildisco had violated certain provisions of the NLRA,sa specifically sections
8(a)(1), 8(a)(5) and 8(d), 37 by unilaterally changing the terms of an
31. Id. at 1192.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
37. Id. § 158(a)(1), § 158(a)(5). Sections 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA provide:
(a) Unfair labor practices by employer.
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title.
Id. Section 8(d) states in relevant part:
Obligation to bargain collectively
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any
agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided,
that where there is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an
industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no
party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party desiring such termination or modification-
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existing collective-bargaining agreement, by failing to make the
above-mentioned payments, and by refusing to negotiate with the
Union. 38 The NLRB ordered Bildisco to make the payments required under the 9agreement and petitioned the Third Circuit to
3
enforce its order.
Consolidating the Union's appeal and the NLRB's petition, 0 the
Third Circuit held that a collective-bargaining agreement was an
executory contract, and that rejection of such agreement was authorized by the Code and not qualified by section 8(d) of the
NLRA. It then ruled that the applicable test for rejection was the
test enunciated in Shipman's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel
Products,4 1 where the debtor had to show that the collective-bargaining agreement was burdensome to the estate and that the equities balanced in favor of rejection. The Third Circuit remanded
Bildisco to the bankruptcy court for reconsideration in light of its
opinion.42
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on January
17, 1983 to resolve the apparent conflict in the rejection standard
adopted by the Third Circuit in Bildisco and that of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Brotherhood of Railway Employees v. REA Express, Inc.4 ' The court in REA Express, a case
decided subsequent to Kevin Steel, appeared to adopt a stricter
test than that enunciated in the latter case by permitting rejection
only if the debtor could demonstrate its reorganization would fail
• . . [complies with the requirements of subsections (1)-(4) which provide for a four

step detailed process that a moving part must follow in order to terminate or modify
a collective-bargaining agreement. These subsections are sometimes referred to as the
notice and cooling-off provisions.]
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
38. 104 S. Ct. at 1193.
39. Id.
40. In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982).
41. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). In Kevin Steel, the defendant steel fabricating company entered into bankruptcy reorganization after its ironworkers' union filed a charge of
unfair labor practices against it. The company, as debtor in possession, successfully petitioned the bankruptcy court for permission to reject its collective-bargaining agreement
with the union. Thereafter, the union appealed the decision to the district court, which
disallowed the rejection, holding that Congress had intended the labor laws to prevail over
the bankruptcy laws. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling. It held that a test much stricter than the "benefit to the estate" standard
applicable to commercial contracts applied to collective-bargaining agreements, and that rejection was permitted "only after thorough scrutiny and a careful balancing of the equities
on both sides." Id. at 707.
42. 104 S. Ct. at 1194.
43. 523 F.2d 164 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
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unless rejection was permitted."" The Supreme Court ruled that
collective-bargaining agreements were executory contracts for purposes of section 365 of the Code, that the applicable rejection standard was, with certain clarifications, the Kevin Steel test, and that,
if the debtor rejected the agreement in the period after the filing of
the bankruptcy petition but before approval by the bankruptcy
court of the rejection, such rejection could not be the premise of an
45
unfair labor practice charge against the debtor.
Regarding the claimed executory status of collective-bargaining
agreements, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the section 365(a) term "executory contract" included collective-bargaining agreements subject to the NLRA4 and that none of the express
section 365(a) limitations on such debtor's general power to reject
applied to collective-bargaining agreements.47 In addition, the
Court ruled that the only collective-bargaining agreements exempted from section 365(a) were those specifically subject to the
Railway Labor Act, there being no similar exemption granted to
collective-bargaining agreements subject to the NLRA. 48
44. Id. In REA Express, the debtor's proposed reorganization plan called for significant cutbacks in operations, consolidation of existing facilities and work transfers. The
union agreement restricted work transfers and consolidation by requiring notice, negotiation
and arbitration if no agreement could be reached over proposed changes. Also, under the
agreement, if an employee decided to follow his or her work on transfer, the employer had
to provide for reimbursement of transportation expenses of both the employee and his or
her family, time off for relocation, protection against loss from sale of home and a $1,000
allowance. The district court ruled that, since these contract provisions accounted for 60%
of the debtor's total weekly expenses, and compliance with them would be fatal to the
debtor's reorganization efforts, rejection of the contract was appropriate. Id. at 172. The
REA Express standard is sometimes referred to as the "business collapse" test and appears
to articulate a different, tougher standard than that of Kevin Steel.
45. 104 S. Ct. at 1194-1201.
46. Id. at 1194-95. The Supreme Court noted that no party to the action argued that
the collective-bargaining agreement was not an executory contract within the meaning of §
365(a). Id. at 1194. The Court was apparently addressing the argument made by the United
Mine Workers of America in its amicus brief that a collective-bargaining agreement was not
an executory contract since both parties to it had reciprocal obligations and, at any point'
during the term of the contract, each party owed the other performance. Id.
47. The section 365(a) limitations on a debtor's broad powers to assume or reject executory contracts are found in sections 365(b) and 365(c) which limit the debtor's power to
assume in certain circumstances, and in section 365(d) which requires the trustee, in the
case of liquidation, to assume or reject within sixty days of the filing of the petition.
For a discussion of the good faith bargaining standard of section 8(a)(5) and 8(d), see text
accompanying notes 116-26; for a discussion surrounding the duty to bargain to impasse, see
text accompanying notes 203-06.
48. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1167 (West 1979), which states:
Notwithstanding section 365 of this title, neither the court nor the trustee may
change the wages or working conditions of employees of the debtor established by a
collective bargaining agreement that is subject to the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.
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In addressing the appropriate standard for rejection, the Supreme Court first acknowledged that the applicable standard
should be stricter than the one for ordinary executory contracts
because of the special nature of a collective-bargaining contract
and the consequent "law of the shop" which it creates.'9 It then
adopted the "balance of the equities" test of Kevin Steel. The Supreme Court reasoned that the stricter REA Express test conflicted with the Chapter 11 policies of flexibility and equity, in that
it subordinated the multiple, competing considerations underlying
a Chapter 11 reorganization to a single issue, i.e., whether rejection
of the agreement was necessary to prevent the debtor from
50
liquidating.
The Supreme Court instructed that, when acting on a petition to
modify or reject such an agreement, the bankruptcy court is to: (1)
be persuaded that both parties have made reasonable efforts to negotiate a voluntary modification and that a prompt and satisfactory solution is unlikely; and (2) make a decision on the rejection
issue only if the parties' inability to reach an agreement threatens
to impede the success of the debtor's reorganization.5 1 The Supreme Court also directed the bankruptcy court to make a reasoned finding on the record as to why it determined that rejection
should be permitted and, in determining what would constitute a
successful rehabilitation, to balance the interests of the affected
parties-debtor, creditors, and employees. 2 Factors to be considered were to include, assuming affirmance, the likelihood and consequences of liquidation for the debtor and the reduced value of
claims and other hardships of creditors, and assuming rejection,
the impact of rejection on the employees.5 3 In balancing the equities, the bankruptcy court is to consider the degree of hardship
151 et seq.) except in accordance with section 6 of such act (45 U.S.C. § 156).

Id.
49. 104 S. Ct. at 1195. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 1196.
51. Id. at 1196-97.
52. Id. at 1197.
53. Id. The Supreme Court indicated that the NLRA required no less because the
debtor was under a duty to bargain in good faith with the union under section 8(a)(5), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), and the policies of the NLRA had been adequately served since reasonable efforts to reach agreement had been made. Id. In a related context, the Court cautioned
that the bankruptcy court need not make any determination outside the field of its expertise, such as determining whether the parties had bargained to impasse. Id.
For a discussion of the duty to confer in good faith and to bargain to impasse under
sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d), see text accompanying notes 116-26, 203-06.
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faced by each party relevant to the success of the reorganization as
well as the qualitative differences of hardship among those
parties.5
Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that when the debtor unilaterally rejects the collective-bargaining agreement after filing its
bankruptcy petition but before receiving bankruptcy court approval to reject, such rejection cannot be the basis of an unfair
labor practice charge.5 5 The Court reasoned that the agreement
was not an enforceable contract within the meaning of section 8(d)
since a rejection of an executory contract relates back to immediately before the filing of the petition initiating the reorganization
and claims relating to such rejection are processed not through a
court of general jurisdiction in a suit against the debtor under the
agreement but through a bankruptcy court by way of filing of a
claim.5 6 Also, the Court ruled that the debtor need not comply
with certain provisions of the NLRA, specifically the section 8(d)
mid-term modification provisions or the section 8(a)(5) duty to
"bargain to impasse. ' 57 The Court reasoned that the "modification" in the agreement was not accomplished by the employer's
unilateral action but by operation of law.5 8 The Court cautioned
that the debtor continues to be an "employer" within the terms of
the NLRA, and is obligated to bargain collectively and in good
faith with the employees' certified representative over the terms of
a new contract pending and following court approval 59 of the rejection of the agreement.8 0
54.
55.
56.

104 S. Ct. at 1197.
Id.
Id.

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. The dissent (Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, concurring in
part and dissenting in part), argued, among other things, that the agreement was reasonably
"in effect" for purposes of section 8(d) in that it supported a claim arising, out of the
debtor's obligations in the post-petition period, whether the contract was accepted or rejected, id. at 4277-78, and that, as an "employer" within the meaning of section 2(2) of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), the debtor must comply with, and commits an unfair labor practice in failing to so comply with, the section 8(a)(5) duty to bargain and the section 8(d)(1)(4) notice and "cooling-off" requirements. 104 S. Ct. at 1201-11.
60. For decisions applying the Supreme Court's Bildisco standard by authorizing the
debtor to reject a collective-bargaining agreement, see In re Bloss Glass Co., 39 Bankr. 694
(M.D. Pa. 1984) (where labor expenses were 27% of debtor's monthly budget, hourly wages
were higher than those of the competition, and debtor reduced other costs of operations,
equities balanced in favor of rejection); In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343 (D. Minn.
1984) (where labor costs were approximately 70% of debtor's gross revenues, equities balanced in favor of rejection).
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Bildisco: SECTION 1113

OF THE

ACT

Swift congressional reaction to Bildisco resulted in the addition
to the Code of section 1113. Little legislative history exists, however, since there was no joint explanatory statement or report submitted by the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. The only
discussion of the new section is found in statements made by certain members of the Judiciary Committees (the conferees) to
Congress.61
While section 1113 largely codified Bildisco's standard for rejection of collective-bargaining agreements, it eliminated, except in
limited circumstances, the ability of the debtor to unilaterally reject such agreements. The new section requires the debtor to comply with a two-step process delineated in section 1113(b) within
rather strict time periods. This two-step process is designed to save
both the labor contract and the business enterprise, prior to court
For decisions applying the Bildisco standard and denying the debtor's motion to reject,
see In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (burdensomeness of collective-bargaining agreement was outweighed by the bad faith actions of debtor and its principals); In re Total Transportation Services, Inc., 37 Bankr. 904 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (where total
claim for five employees was $2800, equities did not balance in favor of rejection).
For decisions distinguishing the Supreme Court's decision in Bildisco, see Gloria Mfg.
Corp. v. International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 734 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1984)
(Bildisco distinguished because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired pre-petition); In re Schuld Mfg., Inc., 43 Bankr. 535 (W.D. Wis. 1984) (debtor not entitled to reject
post-petition collective-bargaining agreement in a liquidation case); Briggs Transp. Co. v.
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 40 Bankr. 972 (D. Minn. 1984) (after debtor received court approval to reject collective-bargaining agreement, debtor requested court to
issue injunction to prevent unions from engaging in strike-related activities designed to disrupt operations in response to debtor's attempt to institute new wage schedules; district
court held that such activities grew out of a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act and since the employer did not comply with the Act's provisions, it
was not entitled to an injunction; fact that employer may go out of business absent requested injunction was unfortunate side effect of labor-management strife); In re Deluca
Distributing Co., 38 Bankr. 588 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (debtor had authority to enter into a postpetition collective-bargaining agreement without bankruptcy court approval and was bound
by that agreement); In re Rath Packing Co. (Rath Packing Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO), 38 Bankr. 552 (N.D. Iowa 1984) (debtor's complaint to
enjoin the Board and the union from filing an unfair labor practice charge not ripe because
the charge was only threatened and not filed); In re IML Freight, Inc., 37 Bankr. 556 (D.
Utah 1984) (trustee's motion to reject collective-bargaining agreement entered into postpetition between trustee and various unions denied since not an executory contract within
the meaning of section 365(a)).
61. See generally 130 CONG. REc. H7489-97 and S8887-91 (daily ed. June 29, 1984).
See also id. at S8887 (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 588 [citations to the June 29, 1984 daily edition of the Congressional Record are hereinafter cited as CONG. REc.]. See supra discussion at note 5.
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adjudication of rejection, by ensuring that the interests of the
struggling business, its union employees, and all other creditors of
the business are balanced equitably and fairly to assure the success
of the reorganization. 2
The first step, delineated in sections 1113(b)(1) es and (b)(2)" occurs after the debtor files the petition in bankruptcy but before it
petitions the court to approve rejection of the agreement. 65 The
debtor is required to make, to the employees' authorized representative, a proposal "based on the most complete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal." ' The proposal is to
provide for "those necessary modifications in the employees' benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization
of the debtor '"' 7 and assures that "all creditors, the debtor and all
of the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably."6 8 The
debtor is also required to furnish the representative with such information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal. 9 The debtor
has an obligation to meet at reasonable times with the authorized
representative and to confer in good faith in attempting to reach
mutually satisfactory modifications of the collective-bargaining
agreement.7 0
The second step requires the court to find that the debtor has
62. See 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprintedin 1984 U.S. CoDE
CONG. & AD.NEws, supra note 61, at 592.
63. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(1) (West Supp. 1985) requires, in pertinent part, the debtor
in possession to:
(A) make a proposal to the authorized representative of the employees ... based on
the most complete and reliable information available at the time of such proposal
which provides for those necessary modifications in the employees benefits and protections that are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assures
that all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are treated fairly and
equitably... [and to]
(B) provide, subject to subsection (d)(3), the representative of the employees with
such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the proposal.
Id.
64. Id. § 1113(b)(2) provides:
During the period beginning on the date of the making of a proposal provided for
in paragraph (1) and ending on the date of the hearing provided for in subsection
(d)(1), the trustee shall meet, at reasonable times, with the authorized representative
to confer in good faith in attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of
such agreement.
Id.
65. Id. § 1113(b).
66. Id. § 1113(b)(1)(A).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 1113(b)(1)(B).
70. Id. § 1113(b)(2).
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complied with the requirements of the first step, that the employees' representative refused to accept the proposal "without good
cause," and that a "balance of the equities clearly favors
71
rejection.
The following discussion probes some of the more significant issues presented by section 1113 which include: what are those "necessary modifications to employees' benefits and protections that
are necessary to permit the reorganization of the debtor"; what is
the standard that assures the creditors, debtor and all affected parties are treated fairly and equitably; what "relevant" information
can and cannot be used or furnished; what are "good faith" negotiations; what does "without good cause" mean; when does a balance
of the equities clearly favor rejection; under what conditions may a
debtor petition for interim changes; and when may the strict sec72
tion 1113 time limitations be relaxed?
A.

What Are Necessary Modifications . . . To Permit the
Reorganization of the Debtor?

The debtor's proposal is to provide for "those necessary modifications in the employees' benefits. ' 73 While the standard is "necessary," the term is not statutorily defined. The expressed intent of
the conferees was that the debtor be allowed to make those
changes in the collective-bargaining agreement that are reasonably
necessary to ensure the likelihood of a successful reorganization.
The conferees cautioned that this is not to be an entire reorganization at an early stage of the Chapter 11 effort when it is often im71. Id. § 1113(c) provides:
(c) The court shall approve an application for rejection of a collective bargaining
agreement only if the court finds that(1) the trustee has, prior to the hearing, made a proposal that fulfills the requirements of subsection (b)(1);
(2) the authorized representative of the employees has refused to accept such
proposal without good cause; and
(3) the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such agreement.

Id.
72. In each of the above-enumerated issues, the question of who bears the burden of
persuasion is presented, although such question is not addressed in depth in this article.
Since compliance with section 1113 is the basis of the debtor's motion to reject, the debtor
bears the initial burden of persuasion by a preponderance of the evidence. However, who
has the burden of persuasion regarding compliance with any subsection of section 1113 will
depend on the circumstances of the case. In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D.
Minn. 1984) (where debtor-company sought bankruptcy court approval to reject collectivebargaining agreement under section 1113, held, pursuant to section 1113, debtor has burden
of proof by preponderance of evidence that requirements of section 1113 have been met).
73. See supra note 63.
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possible to identify all the creditors and their interests.7 4
The critical question of what constitutes necessary modifications
in employees' benefits and protections (so as to permit the reorganization) will likely present itself when the debtor proposes alleged cost-saving modifications to seniority rules such as those governing terminations, layoffs, intra-company transfers, job
descriptions, and salaries, health and welfare benefits and pension
plan contributions. For example, a debtor is likely to propose a
modification or elimination of certain work rules or practices which
curtail the debtor's ability to make work assignments. Also, if a
debtor decides to consolidate operations by a total shut-down of
inefficient plants or facilities, the debtor may propose modifications to contract provisions dealing with the impact or effect of
such decision (e.g., health and welfare benefits, vacation days, etc.).
Finally, a debtor is likely to propose a reduction of salaries, and
the reduction or elimination of expensive fringe benefits such as
paid holidays, paid sick days, paid personal days, reimbursed educational or child care expenses, health and dental benefits for the
employees and their families, and pension plan contributions.
The critical issue in all of the above is not whether the proposed
modifications will result in a reduction of operating costs but
whether they are necessary to permit the debtor's reorganization.
If the ratio of labor costs under the agreement to the debtor's total
operating costs is high, a number of the above-enumerated proposed modifications would probably be deemed "necessary" to permit the reorganization. Such modifications would be directly related to the debtor's financial ability to reorganize.
If such ratio is not high, as might occur when the debtor invokes
Chapter 11 because of the existence of a contingent tort liability or
poor financial conditions unrelated to labor costs, 75 then, although

the above-proposed modifications would reduce overall costs, such
modifications may not be deemed "necessary" to permit the
debtor's reorganization.
Predictably, the debtor will argue for the more flexible "reasonable relationship" test while the union will urge a more stringent
74. 130 CONG. REc. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 592.
75. In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 Bankr. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D. Minn. 1984) (savings under debtor's section 1113(b) proposal
was 2 % of debtor's monthly operating expenses and found not to be necessary to permit the
debtor's reorganization, especially since the collective-bargaining agreement was to expire
within eight months).
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"direct relationship" one. While both tests would consider as relevant the question of whether or not the proposed modification
saves costs, neither test would find such factor solely determinative. In the final analysis, what is "necessary" will be a case by case
judgment by the affected parties (and perhaps ultimately by the
court) of what will permit the reorganization in the context of the
other section 1113 requirements.
B.

What Standard Assures That All Creditors, the Debtor and

All of the Affected Parties Are Treated Fairly and Equitably?
The new rejection procedures provide that the debtor's proposal
is to assure that all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties
are treated equitably. 7 Underlying the issue of what is the applicable standard by which the debtor "assures" that all affected parties
are treated "fairly and equitably," are co-related issues such as the
identity of the "affected parties," what action, if any, is required
by them, 77 and what is fair and equitable treatment.
While the Act defines none of the above words and phrases, the
legislative history provides some direction. The conferees stated
that the phrase "all the affected parties" describes only those parties, including union and non-union employees, affected in a direct,
non-minor way,78 such as those with contractual, legal or financial
ties to the debtor that would make them "the logical parties to the
equities balancing. '79 Also, the phrase "treated fairly and equitably" means that all the affected parties are treated fairly and equitably in the concessions they are asked to make so that employees
covered by the collective-bargaining agreement do not solely bear
the economies of the reorganization." Further, the same standard
of equity balancing that is to take place during the proposal step is
likewise to take place when the court finally rules on the application for rejection." On the other hand, where the conferees referred to "fair[] and equitabl[e]" treatment and "equities balancing," they did not define those terms. The failure by Congress and,
76. See supra note 63.
77. See infra note 83.
78. 130 CONG. REC. S8887 (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 583.
79. 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 593.
80. 130 CONG. REC. H7489 (statement of Rep. Rodino), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 577.
81. 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 593.
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to a lesser extent, the conferees, to provide specific definitions will
undoubtedly produce future litigation.
In the context of the flexible standard of fair and equitable
treatment, the applicable measure for determining whether the
standard is met would probably involve a comparison of the concessions asked of the union, on a dollar or percentage basis, with
those sought from other affected parties. Such factors as the affected party's financial situation and ability to absorb the concessions or to spread them over a customer base would also probably
be considered and compared with concessions asked of the union.
Those parties with contractual, legal or financial ties to the
debtor include all secured and unsecured creditors. Such parties
would include lenders, principal suppliers and trade creditors,
union and non-union employees, and the debtor's management.
Consequently, depending upon the circumstances of the case, the
debtor might be required by section 1113 to demonstrate to the
union that concessions similar to those described below have been
or will be made by creditors and the other affected parties."'
Secured creditors such as banks, commercial lending institutions, principal shareholders and key management, and the federal,
state, and local governments, as lenders or as guarantors of loans,
may be requested to release security interests in collateral such as
machinery, equipment, inventory, accounts receivables, or real estate and/or to temporarily suspend principal payments and reduce
or suspend interest payments. Unsecured creditors, such as lessors,
principal suppliers and trade creditors, may be requested to suspend, reduce or forgive pre-petition and/or post-petition rental obligations or claims for non-payment of delivered materials for
which payment is due, and to continue to extend credit, often over
a longer period of time and at below market rates. Management
would likely have to agree to concessions whereby salaries are cut,
expense accounts, travel allowances and certain benefits are either
eliminated or substantially reduced and whereby management personnel would be reduced. In summary, the quantity and quality of
concessions minimally required under section 1113 will remain a
function of the circumstances of each case.8"
82. Regarding whether and when concessions must be agreed to, and not just proposed
and considered, it appears a more reasonable approach, particularly in view of the time
constraints of a Chapter 11 reorganization and section 1113's fair and equitable treatment
standard, to require the debtor to show that he has proposed to or received concessions from
creditors which are contingent on concessions received from the union.
83. Neither section 1113 nor any provision of the bankruptcy laws require any party to
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What Type of Information Must Be Provided?

While the section 1113 duties to use and to provide complete,
relevant and reliable information are simply stated,84 the issues
created by such duties may be difficult to resolve. Some of those
issues include the type of information which must be provided and
to whom and under what circumstances must the information be
supplied. While the conferees' intent was that a section 1113 information request was to be interpreted in the "most practical and
workable manner possible, '8 5 they gave little further direction concerning the issue, did not address what would constitute "complete
and reliable information available at the time of the proposal," and
generally further cautioned that "all relevant information concerning the proposal be provided the union for its evaluation
86
purposes."
While there is a duty to provide adequate information under section 1125 for the creditor's analysis of a reorganization plan,8 7 that
make concessions. A secured creditor's allowed claim, 11 U.S.C.A. § 502 (West 1979 and
Supp. 1985), is secured to the extent of the value of the creditor's interest in the bankrupt
estate's interest in the property and unsecured as to the excess of such creditor's claim in
such property. Id. §§ 506(a) and 1129(b)(2). Certain unsecured creditors' claims receive priority over other unsecured claims. Id. § 507. Each claim in a particular class is to receive the
same treatment under a reorganization plan, unless the holder of the claim agrees to a less
favorable treatment of the claim, id. § 1123(a)(4), or a certain portion of the class of claims
of creditors has accepted the plan even though a particular individual creditor has not. Id. §
1126(c) and (d). The court, however, has the authority to approve a reorganization plan that
impairs certain claims when the court finds that the plan does not discriminate unfairly and
is fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims that has not accepted, but is impaired under, the plan. Id. § 1129(b). Thus, the court has the ultimate authority to confirm
a plan that impairs claims and any party that makes concessions in the context of section
1113(b)(1) will be deemed to have agreed to a less favorable treatment of its claim under 11
U.S.C.A. § 1123(a) (West Supp. 1985).
84. Id. § 1113(b)(1)(A) and (B). See supra note 63 for the text of these sections. Under
section 1113(b)(1)(A), the debtor is required to base its proposal on the most complete and
reliable information available at the time of the proposal. Under section 1113(b)(1)(B), the
debtor is to provide the union such relevant information as is necessary to evaluate the
proposal. The section 1113(b)(1)(B) requirement always encompasses all the information on
which the proposal is based. Since both sections deal with the provision concerning the use
of information, they will be dealt with together in the context of the information heading.
85. 130 CONG. REc. S8889 (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws, supra note 61, at 587.
86. 130 CONG. REC. S8892 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 591.
87. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1125. Section 1125 provides in pertinent part:
(1) In this section(a) "adequate information" means information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as
far as is reasonably practicable in light of the nature and history of the debtor and
the condition of the debtor's books and records, that would enable a hypothetical
reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to
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duty appears to be much narrower than that required by section
1113. Section 1125 defines the term "adequate information" as sufficiently detailed information that would enable a hypothetical investor to make an informed judgment about the proposed reorganization plan.
Section 1125 is not broad enough to include the type of section
1113 information needed by the union to evaluate a proposal to
modify employee benefits. Section 1113 contemplates the provision
of both financial and non-financial information so that the union is
able to evaluate the methodology utilized by the bankrupt for both
formulating and implementing modifications of employees' salaries
and benefits. This is clearly distinct from modification of only the
amounts of employee salaries and benefits. Also, the section 1125
definition does not speak to information concerning concessions
given by creditors and affected parties, information which is relevant to a determination of whether affected parties are treated
fairly and equitably. Since both the debtor and the union are presumably familiar with the broad duty to provide information under
the labor laws and since section 1125 is too narrow for the purposes of section 1113, the debtor and union (as well as the court)
may resolve information related issues in the context of the duty to
supply requested information under the labor laws and not under
section 1125.
The duty to furnish information pursuant to a good faith request
derives from the duty to bargain collectively pursuant to section
8(a)(5) of the NLRA. 5 This duty obliges both employers and unions."' The important inquiries are whether the requested information is relevant to the legitimate collective bargaining needs of the
union and, if so, whether nondisclosure is appropriate.
Regarding the relevancy inquiry, if the requested information
make an informed judgment about the plan ....
Id.
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1982). A refusal .to disclose the requested information may
constitute a refusal to bargain in good faith which would be an unfair labor practice. International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 18, 25 (D.C. Cir.
1980). The union may file an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB under 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(5), Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 357 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
and once the Board orders disclosure of the information, either the charged or the charging
party may seek judicial review in federal court of such order. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). If the
employer continues to refuse disclosure, the Board may enforce its order in a federal court.
Id. § 153(d).
89. The union is also obligated to provide the employer with requested information
relevant to the collective-bargaining process. Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing and
Graphic Communications Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
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concerns subjects about which the union and the employer are
duty-bound to bargain, i.e., "mandatory subjects of bargaining,"9 0
the information is presumed relevant because it deals with the
"core of the employer-employee relationship." 9 1 Information considered presumptively relevant for bargaining purposes includes: a
list of employees' names and home addresses, including non-unit
employees; 92 wage and salary data9 s including job classifications; 4
factors involved in determining merit increases; 95 relevant information concerning health and welfare, insurance, and pension benefit
plans; 9 and relevant financial information of an employer who
claims financial inability to meet the demands of a union.9 7 While
the relevancy presumption9 8 is considered rebuttable,9 9 the rebuttal is usually limited to a showing by the employer of the union's
absence of good faith, harassment, or lack of necessity for the information. 10 0 Consequently, an employer would be unsuccessful,
90. "Mandatory subjects of bargaining" are items that fall within the phrase "wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
91. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1965).
92. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77, 84 (2d Cir.) (list of
employees' names and addresses for communications purposes), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928
(1969); Boston Herald-Traveler Corp. v. NLRB, 223 F.2d 58 (1st Cir. 1955) (names, ages and
employment dates).
93. NLRB v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956), rev'g, 235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.
1956). If the employer does not contest the relevancy of requested information before the
Board, it is foreclosed by section 10(e) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982), from raising
the issue before the court. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 311 & n.10 (1979).
94. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965) (information concerning
administrative and confidential positions of employment required to be disclosed even
though information related to non-unit employees).
95. NLRB v. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954) (merit raises), cert.
denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
96. NLRB v. Cone Mills Corp., 419 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1969) (statistical basis for pension plans), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1040 (1970).
97. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 151-53 (1956) (where company refused to
grant a proposed wage increase due to the alleged financial situation of the company, and
also refused to turn over any evidence to substantiate its claims, the employer was guilty of
an unfair labor practice in failing to bargain in good faith).
98. The standard of review for relevancy issues appears to be a liberal discovery-type
standard. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). See generally Comment,
Unions' Rights to Information About Occupational Health Hazards Under the National
Labor Relations Act, 5 INDUs. REL. L.J. 247, 279-80 (1983); Comment, Union's Right to Information vs. Confidentiality of Employer Trade Secrets: Accommodating the Interests
Through Procedural Burdens and Restricted Disclosure, 66 IOwA L. REV. 1333, 1337-42
(1981).
99. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1965); Prudential
Ins. Co. of America v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969).
100. Whitin Mach. Works, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954) (employer should be given the
opportunity to show that the request for information was made in bad faith or used as a
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except in very limited circumstances, in refusing disclosure on relevancy grounds.
The second inquiry under the labor laws is whether the employer can refuse to disclose the requested information because the
information is a trade secret 0 1 or is otherwise confidential in that
disclosure would cause a competitive disadvantage or affect significant privacy interests of employees. Regarding the competitive disadvantage issue, the burden is usually on the employer to demon10 2
strate how disclosure would cause the claimed potential injury.
As to the privacy issue, the employees' privacy interests (usually
raised by the employer) 10 3 are balanced against the union's needs
for the information' by weighing such factors as the sensitive nature of the requested information, the potential for harm and harrassment to employees by disclosure, the availability of a less intrusive alternative, the employer's good faith in raising the privacy
claim, the public labor policy favoring disclosure, and the adequacy
of security provisions in guarding against the unwarranted
redisclosure.' 05
Consequently, the critical issues relating to the duty to provide
relevant information under section 1113 will be whether the inforharassment tactic by the union and that the information sought was not relevant to the
bargaining issues), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955).
101. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 998 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 964 (1965); American Cyanamid Co. (Marietta Plant), 129 N.L.R.B. 683, 684 (1960)
(refusal to bargain charge against employer denied because employer had legitimate economic interest in nondisclosure of records containing information regarding certain unique
manufacturing techniques and processes utilized in production).
102. NLRB v. Frontier Homes Corp., 371 F.2d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1967) (disclosure
required despite confidentiality claims of employer of company's selling price lists so that
the union could determine bonus computations of employees).
103. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 574 (3d Cir. 1980) (employer may be the only one with sufficient notice to assert employee privacy interests because disclosure of requested medical records would cause employees to be hesitant about
supplying further medical data needed by the employer; however, employee medical records
held discoverable even without the employees' consent because there was no evidence that
the medical files contained any highly sensitive information, disclosure of which would be a
severe invasion of employee privacy). See generally Comment, The Union's Right to Information at the Expense of Employees' Privacy Rights, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 755 (1984).
104. Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) (company's concern with the
employee privacy interests involved in the disclosure to a union of aptitude test scores accompanied by employee names was "legitimate and substantial" and outweighed union's
interest in them). Cf. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir.
1980).
105. In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979), the Court ruled that, because of a lack of adequate safeguards against redisclosure by the union of aptitude test
questions, the test questions were to be turned over to an intermediary instead of directly to
the union. Id. at 316-17, 320.
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mation is relevant and/or necessary and whether, if disclosed, its
confidentiality can be protected. Regarding the relevancy issue, the
conferees appear to endorse a liberal information disclosure policy
in the context of the reorganization.106 There will, however, be circumstances in which valid arguments can be made as to whether
the requested information is truly relevant or necessary to the proposal evaluation process. For example, certain non-cost related information or outdated financial data may not be relevant to the
proposal evaluation process.
As to the confidentiality issue, section 1113 appears to accommodate the employer's legitimate confidentiality concerns in that protective orders may be issued pursuant to section 1113(d)(3). 10 7 The

conferees stated that section 1113(d)(3) granted discretion to the
court to protect against any disclosure of trade secrets or other
confidential information which the business perceives as a threat
to its competitive standing.108 However, the term "trade secret"
was not defined. Furthermore, the test of what disclosures would
compromise the position of the debtor or constitute a threat to
competitive standing was not examined. Also, whether legitimate
employees' privacy concerns are afforded the protection of a section 1113(d) protective order was not addressed.
The term "trade secret" can probably be defined as a formula,
device or compilation of information which is used in a business
and which would give such business an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.109 A "threat
to competitive standing" is a standard flexible enough to protect
financial and otherwise commercially sensitive items such as customer lists but rigid enough to exclude any concerns about privacy
106. 130 CONG. REC. 8889 (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 588. See also 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 594.
107. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(3) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
The court may enter such protective orders, consistent with the needs of the authorized representative of the employee to evaluate the . . . proposal and the application
for rejection, as may be necessary to prevent disclosure of information provided to
such representative where such disclosure could compromise the position of the
debtor with respect to its competitors in the industry in which it is engaged.

Id.
108. 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 594.

109. A definition of the term "trade secrets" is found in the Restatement of Torts §
757, comment b (1939): "A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity
to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." Id.
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issues.
As far as privacy related issues are concerned, the debtor would
have to argue that, consistent with labor law concepts, it is not
required to provide privacy related information under section 1113.
Alternatively, if such information is required to be disclosed, the
debtor might argue that the information can be protected by a section 1113(d) protective order or, at a minimum, under a protective
order issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). 110
The debtor might also argue that the protective order should require that the produced information be viewed only by a limited,
defined group of union personnel and consultants specializing in
workouts, whom the union has employed to evaluate the proposal.
Depending on the circumstances, the section 1113 duty to disclose could require disclosure of: current balance sheets, income
statements and supporting data; information such as details of expense accounts, pension and profit sharing plan contributions, long
term employment or consultant contracts, or deferred compensation agreements; allegedly commercially sensitive information
found in strategic plans, business plans, profit plans; and information concerning creditors and customers. The critical inquiry with
each category of. requested information will be a case by case analysis of whether a protective order will sufficiently protect the alleged interest in confidentiality.'
110. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state:
Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought, and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending. . . may
make any order which justice requires to protect the party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense including one or more of the
following: . . . (7) that a trade secret or other confidential research, development or
commercial information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
Violation of a protective order could subject the violator to a contempt of court charge.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(D). If the court determines a violation to be a civil contempt, the
employer is allowed a compensatory recovery for losses sustained. United States v. United
Mineworkers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947). If the violator lacks funds to sufficiently compensate the employer, e.g., for an unlawful disclosure of trade secrets, the court
could deem the contempt as criminal, thereby allowing the court to impose a fine, or to
sentence the violator to prison. It is suggested that a person with knowledge of another's
confidential information or trade secret is arguably deterred from violating a protective order and disclosing it to others with the possibility of facing a prison term.
111. Another issue presented under this section is whether the employer is required to
generate any information. While section 1113(b)(1) imposes no explicit requirement to generate information, a court may again look for guidance to the duty imposed under the
NLRA. Under the Act, the employer is not required to furnish requested data in any specific form as long as the available data is sufficient to allow the union to clearly understand
the issues and permit negotiations to proceed without undue delay. NLRB v. International
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What Does "To Confer In Good Faith" Mean?

Section 1113(b)(2) requires the debtor to meet with an authorized representative of the employees to "confer in good faith in
attempting to reach mutually satisfactory modifications of such
agreement."'1 2 The term "good faith" is not, however, defined in
the Act.118 While the conferees emphasized that traditional concepts of labor law were not to be infused into this section,"" the
conferees did express an intention that the provision be interpreted in the "most practical and workable manner possible."' 15
Since section 1113 deals with relationships originally created in the
context of labor law, both labor law and bankruptcy law concepts
of good faith may guide the bankruptcy court to a practical and
workable interpretation of the section 1113 directive "to confer in
good faith."
In the context of labor law, both the NLRB and the courts appear to define "good faith" by what is conspicuously absent from
the parties' behavior. While an inquiry is made into the entire conduct of the parties and not just certain isolated acts," 6 a lack of
good faith has been shown where a party: has engaged in negotiations that were in "pretended good faith" with the actual intent
being to frustrate the negotiations;" 7 used stall and delay tactics;" 8 was not willing to consider making concessions," 9 even
20
though the NLRA does not require a party to make concessions;
Tel. & Tel. Corp., 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968). While
labor law may be useful in this regard for guidance, a bankruptcy court may review the form
of the information supplied, i.e., whether the debtor provided the union with summarized,
intelligible information supporting its proposal in lieu of raw, often confusing data. Such
review could be relevant in the course of the court's section 1113(c) "without good cause" or
"balance of the equities" analysis. See infra notes 135-58 and accompanying text.
112. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
113. Note that the Supreme Court in Bildisco did not specifically mention a party's
good faith as one of the factors to be balanced in the equities balancing process.
114. 130 CONG. REc. S8887 (statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG.

& AD.

NEWS,

supra note 61, at 581.

115. Id.
116. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1980); NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
117. Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 19 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595
(1941).
118. A.H. Belo Corp. v. NLRB, 411 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1007 (1970); NLRB v. Luisi Truck Lines, 384 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. My Store,
Inc., 345 F.2d 494 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965).
119. NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1980); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg.
Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976).
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made proposals and demands that were insincere or unreasonable
and had the effect of frustrating agreement or unnecessarily prolonging negotiations; 2 ' suddenly reversed its position after a supposed agreement had been reached; 12 insisted on unreasonable
bargaining conditions s or made unilateral changes in the actual
subjects being negotiated. 24 A lack of good faith has also been
demonstrated where an employer communicated directly with the
company employees before the union rejected the employer's final
offer, thereby creating the impression that a bargaining agent was
not needed; 125 or the person with the authority to bind the party is
repeatedly absent from the negotiating sessions. 2 6
The bankruptcy courts have considered the issue of "good faith"
in the context of the balancing of the equities question. The courts
have found that a lack of "good faith" has been shown where a
party: hired non-union employees after filing the bankruptcy peti28
tion; 1 7 violated the agreement to benefit the owner's family;
failed to remit union dues it deducted from the wages of employees;129 employer and principals indicated desire to be rid- of the
union, by threatening words and by starting a competing, nonunion company to which was transferred some of debtor's funds
and equipment; 3 0° and used bankruptcy laws to escape from an inconvenient collective-bargaining agreement.'' Bad faith was not
shown, however, where the debtor: asked for concessions;"'2 sought
to reject the collective-bargaining agreement unilaterally;" 33 filed
petition in liquidation where the company executives were foregoing compensation;" 4 or had not made its contributions to the pen121. NLRB v. Fant Milling Co., 360 U.S. 301 (1959); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of BorgWarner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); NLRB v.
American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
122. NLRB v. Texas Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 365 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1966).
123. NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Sons Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941).
124. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-38 (1962).
125. NLRB v. Movie Star, Inc., 361 F.2d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Highland
Shoe, 119 F.2d 218, 222-23 (1st Cir. 1941).
126. NLRB v. Coletti Color Prints, Inc., 387 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1967).
127. In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949, 959 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
128. Id. at 960.
129. Id.
130. In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496, 503 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
131. In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 478, 479-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
132. In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983); In re
Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
133. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
134. In re Ryan Co., 83 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 17,948, 17,953, 16 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d
(MB) 101, 105 (D. Conn. 1978).
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sion and health and welfare plans.
The issue of whether the debtor has conferred in good faith
under section 1113 is not an issue which the bankruptcy court is
required by section 1113 to address in its determination of whether
to approve rejection of the agreement. 1- 5 The issue will arise im-

plicitly, however, when the bankruptcy court, pursuant to section
1113(c), determines: whether evidence exists that the union rejected the proposal without good cause, i.e., did the debtor act in
"bad faith" so that the union's rejection was with cause?; and,
whether a balancing of the equities, one of which could be the
debtor's "good faith," clearly favors rejection.
Since the purpose of section 1113 is to foster an environment
wherein all the affected parties can work equitably towards a successful reorganization, such purpose would be frustrated if the
debtor engaged in any of the above-enumerated activities deemed
by the courts to be in "bad faith." Thus, labor law and pre-section
1113 bankruptcy law concepts of "good faith" will be useful guides
for the bankruptcy court in making its section 1113(c)
determinations. 13 6
E. What Does "Without Good Cause" Mean?
Section 1113(c) requires the bankruptcy court, in determining
whether to approve rejection of the collective-bargaining agreement, to find that the employees' representative has refused the
debtor's proposal "without good cause.'

3

7

Neither the Act nor the

conferees defined what constitutes "without good cause." The conferees did explain that the purpose of this provision was to protect
the debtor from a union's rejection without good cause.138 Also,
since neither labor law nor bankruptcy law, prior to section 1113,
specifically defines the phrase "without good cause," there is no
judicial guide for the bankruptcy court to use in its interpretation
of the phrase.
In light of the purpose of section 1113, it appears that the phrase
can be interpreted to require the union to both confer in "good
faith" and, at a minimum, to compromise on proposals which meet
the section 1113(b)(1) test and, thus, are necessary to the debtor's
135. The section 1113(b)(2) duty "to confer in good faith" does not apply, by the
terms of section 1113, to the employees' representative..
136. See generally Note, Good Faith in Chapter Eleven Reorganizations, 35 S.C.L.
REv. 333-47 (1984).
137. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
138. 130 CONG. REC. S8998 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
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reorganization. This interpretation would impose on the union
those duties imposed on the debtor in section 1113(b). Ultimately,
to the extent that the evidence supports a finding that the proposal fails to meet the section 1113(b)(1) requirements or that the
debtor conferred in "bad faith," the union's rejection may, indeed,
be with cause. The section 1113(c)(2) requirement that the court
find that the union rejected the compromise without good cause
will probably probe whether the union negotiated in good faith to139
ward a successful reorganization of the business.
F. When Does the Balance of the Equities Clearly Favor
Rejection of Collective-BargainingAgreements?
Before a court addresses the section 1113 balancing of the equities test, it must first have determined that the debtor's proposal
meets the section 1113(b)(1) requirements and that the union rejected such proposal without good cause. Thus, the issue of
whether the collective-bargaining agreement, if rejected, would
permit reorganization will have already been addressed and answered in the affirmative. 14 0 The rather narrow issue becomes
whether the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection.
The balance the equities statutory standard, the conferees
stated, is to be interpreted in light of the standard enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Bildisco.'4 Also, the conferees explained
that, although the equities will almost always balance in favor of
one resolution or another, use of the word clearly was intended to
assure that rejection is not warranted where the equities balance
exactly equally on each side. 14 2 Other than to say that the Bildisco
standard applied, the conferees gave little guidance as to what factors are to be included or excluded in the balancing process, and
the weight to be assigned to each.
The standard announced by the Supreme Court in Bildisco is a
modified Kevin Steel standard, where the interests of the affected
1 43
parties-debtor, creditors, and employees-are to be balanced.
139. Query whether the debtor's failure to confer in good faith and the union's rejection without good cause could be the subject of an unfair labor practice charge by the
NLRB.
140. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(c) (West Supp. 1985).
141. 130 CONG. REc. S8891 (statement of Sen Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 594. See also 130 CONG. REC. S8889 (statement of Sen. Dole),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 588.
142. 130 CONG. REc. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 594.
143. Shopmen's Local 455 v. Kevin Steel Products, Inc., 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975).
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In Kevin Steel, the Supreme Court outlined factors to be considered in the balancing process: assuming affirmance, the likelihood
and consequences of liquidation of the debtor and the reduced
value of claims and other hardships of creditors; and assuming rejection, the impact of rejection on the employees."" The Supreme
Court in Bildisco also instructed the court to consider the degree
of hardship faced by each party relevant to the success of the reorganization as well as the qualitative differences of hardships among
145
such parties.
Bankruptcy courts, pre- and post-Bildisco, have considered the
following factors in determining whether rejection of the collectivebargaining agreement would benefit or burden a party and whether
the equities balance in favor of rejection: the possibility of liquidation versus a successful reorganization, with and without the rejection; the relative impact of liquidation on each creditor, employee,
and shareholder group involved;"' the possibility of a strike by the
union against the debtor after rejection and the impact of such
strike on the reorganization;" 7 the inadequacy of relief for the employees and other claimants since many benefits under such agreements are non-monetary, such as seniority or work breaks, and
8
generally incapable of providing a basis for a damage award;"
wage and benefit levels compared to those of workers at similar
companies or viewed in context of impact on the debtor's financial
situation;" 9 the parties' good faith; 50 whether the debtor lays off
144. Id.
145. Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. at 1197.
146. In re Brada Miller Freight System, Inc., 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983) (rejection
permitted where contract obligations accounted for 50-90% of debtor's daily gross revenues
and if the contract was not rejected, debtor would be unable to reach break even point); In
re Connecticut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (D. Conn. 1980) (debtor's obligation to
pay 3% of yearly operating expenses toward union contract not sufficiently burdensome); In
re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr.
496 (N.D. Ohio 1984); In re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D. Minn. 1984).
147. In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 167 (E.D. Pa. 1978), appeal dismissed, 595 F.2d 1211 (3d Cir. 1979) (debtor had ceased operations and could satisfy union
demands only from existing assets which were to be employed in an arrangement with unsecured creditors so that it was clear that reorganization would be impossible without rejection of union contracts).
148. In re Allied Supermarkets, Inc., 6 BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 968 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
149. In re Briggs Transp. Co., 39 Bankr. 343, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 1066 (D.
Minn. 1984) (debtor's wage costs amounted to 70% of gross revenue but the industry standard was between 56% and 60%); Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local 807 (Bohack II),
431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y.) (rejection permitted where debtor had lost $10 million and
could not successfully reorganize while paying $1 million annually to unionized drivers for
whom there was no work), aff'd per curiam, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 825 (1978).
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employees contrary to the terms of the collective-bargaining agreement as part of the process of shutting down part of its plant or of
its total operations;"" whether pension and health care plans impose burdens on the debtor; 152 whether the payments of benefits
would prejudice the position of the unsecured creditors;' 53 whether
the contract is due to expire shortly;154 the terms of the repayment
plan entered into by the debtor;1 55 and the cost-spreading abilities
of the parties.'"1
The cases in which such factors have been discussed have all
dealt with whether the agreement should be rejected; however, the
reported cases have not adequately addressed how claims for rejection-related damages are estimated.157 There will, therefore, un150. See supra discussion in notes 127-34 and accompanying text.
151. Bohack II, 431 F. Supp. 646. Courts appear hesitant to force a debtor to continue
paying employees for whom it has no work, although this situation cannot be treated summarily. See In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165 (the court applied the the REA
Express standard in ruling that the debtor remained liable under the collective-bargaining
agreement for substantial medical, insurance and vacation benefits as well as severance pay,
even though the company had shut down operations permanently during reorganization).
152. In re Rath Packing Co., 36 Bankr. 979, 11 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 498 (N.D. Iowa
1984) (if collective-bargaining agreement were rejected, employees could obtain better
health insurance and debtor would significantly reduce its health care costs). Cf. In re Pesce
Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
153. Id. In re Allied Technology, 8 Bankr. 366 (S.D. Ohio 1980) (diversion of nonoperating debtor's limited funds to satisfy labor agreement would work hardship on unsecured creditors and cause reorganization plan to fail).
154. In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949. In the context of the section 1113(b)(1)
analysis of what is "necessary to permit reorganization," the time remaining on the contract
would probably have to be viewed in the context of the ratio of union contract costs to the
debtor's operating expenses to determine whether the savings would be minimal. See also In
re American Provision Co., 44 Bankr. 907 (D. Minn. 1984).
155. In re Connecticut Celery, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (D. Conn. 1980) (where
debtor substituted a repayment plan providing for contract rejection with one which failed
to mention contract rejection and which provided for smaller reimbursements to creditors,
such substitution was deemed a concession by the debtor such that it could maintain its
labor contract without being forced into Chapter 7 bankruptcy).
156. In re Pesce Baking Co., 43 Bankr. 949.
157. Damages would be difficult to measure, if measurable at all, for such non-economic items not discussed in the text such as union recognition, dues check-off provisions,
pension rights, welfare rights, seniority rights, disciplinary procedures, rest breaks, meal periods, time off for jury duty and uniforms.
Damages will most likely also be difficult to measure for certain economic related matters
arising under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 (MPPAA), Pub. L.
No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208, amending the Employee Retirement Insurance Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982): Under the MPPAA, when the debtor is part of an
under-funded multi-employer plan, such as the Teamsters' Central States Pension Fund,
the calculation of termination or partial withdrawl liabilities may be a claim in bankruptcy
which must be estimated. See In re Amalgamated Foods, Inc., 41 Bankr. 616 (C.D. Cal.
1984) (debtor seeking to withdraw from pension trust fund can bypass ERISA statutory
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doubtedly be controversy as to how to estimate such claims, particularly claims for non-economic damages caused, for example, by
loss of transfer rights, scope of work rights and grievance and arbitration procedures. 158
A number of the above factors, particularly the direct cost-related ones, may be considered by the bankruptcy court earlier in
the two-step process contemplated by section 1113 in the context
of whether the modifications are "necessary to permit the reorganization." The inquiry would be as to what the potential savings are
in costs to the debtor if the agreement is modified and whether
such potential savings would permit reorganization given the
debtor's financial picture and other circumstances. The less directcost related items, such as the union's more intangible, non-compensable benefits and the parties' good faith, will probably be considered under the rubric of the balance the equities standard. In
the final analysis, as long as the bankruptcy court follows the relevant directions of the Bildisco court, it has wide discretion under
the balance the equities test to consider relevant items that do not
fall neatly within the other section 1113 tests.
G.

Under What Conditions May a Debtor Petition For Interim
Changes?

Section 1113(e) provides that interim changes may be implemented in the "terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules"
(terms and conditions) provided by a collective-bargaining agreement, if such changes are "essential to the continuation of the
debtor's business" or in order "to avoid irreparable damage to the
estate. '159 Such changes are to be authorized by the court after
arbitration process in favor of the ordinary claims process in bankruptcy); In re Computerized Steel Fabricators, Inc., 40 Bankr. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (post-confirmation effort to collect from debtor an alleged MPPAA withdrawl liability appropriate since collective agreement not rejected by debtor before order of confirmation).
158. For commentaries on the applicable tests for rejection' of collective-bargaining
agreements, see generally Note, Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 15 Loy. U.
CHi. L.J. 761 (1984); Bordewieck and Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements by Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293 (1983); Note, Kevin Steel and
REA Express Revisited: When is a Collective Bargaining Agreement Burdensome?, 56
TEMP. L.Q. 252 (1983); Note, The Bankruptcy Law's Effect on Collective BargainingAgreements, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 391 (1981).
159. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(e) (West Supp. 1985) provides:
If during a period when the collective bargaining agreement continues in effect, and if
essential to the continuation of the debtor's business, or-in order to avoid irreparable
damage to the estate, the court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the trustee
to implement interim changes in the terms, conditions, wages, benefits, or work rules
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notice and a hearing scheduled in accordance with the needs of the
debtor.6 0
The conferees cautioned that the interim changes are to be authorized only with respect to terms and conditions, and only to
those terms and conditions about which the debtor has made a
proposed modification in its section 1113(b) proposal.' Further,
the conferees emphasized the temporary nature of such changes by
stressing that such changes would be effective only until the court
rules on the application to reject. 6 2 If the interim changes are authorized and the application to reject the agreement is not approved, any wages or benefits withheld unilaterally are to be
treated as costs of administration.'6 3 Finally, the conferees stated
that the court is to use the REA Express test 6 4 as the applicable
6 5
standard for interim relief.1

In REA Express, the Second Circuit ruled that before a debtor
could reject a collective-bargaining agreement, it must demonstrate
that without such rejection the business would collapse.6 6 The focus of most of the courts that employed this test was whether the
costs of the labor contract were so burdensome as to probably
cause the debtor's liquidation. 6 7 The Supreme Court in Bildisco
provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Any hearing under this paragraph
shall be scheduled in accordance with the needs of the trustee. The implementation
of such interim changes shall not render the application for rejection moot.
Id.
160. Id. Section 1113(e) refers to the term "trustee." Section 1113(b)(1) defines "trustee" to include a debtor in possession. Also, what type of hearing is required under this
section was not addressed by the conferees. The rule of construction in section 102(1) of the
Code provides that a prior hearing is not required if notice is properly given and if an actual
hearing is not timely requested by a party in interest or if insufficient time exists to have
one under the circumstances of the case. Thus, while a hearing on the debtor's request is
required by section 1113(e), it is arguable that the bankruptcy court can order such interim
changes ex parte until the hearing is held.
161. 130 CONG. REC. H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
162. The National Bankruptcy Conference urged that section 1113 contain an "escape
valve" to deal with emergency situations requiring immediate relief until the court rules on
the application. Congress responded by adding section 1113(e).
163. 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
164. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164. See supra text accompanying note 44.
165. 130 CONG. REC. S8898 (statement of Sen. Packwood); id. at H7496 (statement of
Rep. Morrison). Neither the statute nor the conferees clarify what evidence the debtor must
present to meet the section 1113(e) standard, particularly in the context of the temporary
nature of the relief. Also, there is no clear statement that the court is authorized to condition the interim order, to ensure that the parties continue good faith negotiations, by requiring, for example, the posting of a bond or the setting of an expiration date for the order.
166. See the discussion of the case supra text accompanying note 44.
167. See, e.g., In re Brada Miller, 702 F.2d 890 (11th Cir. 1983); Bohack Corp. v.
Truck Drivers Local 807 (Bohack If), 431 F. Supp. 646 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Cf. In re Connecti-
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specifically rejected the REA Express test, reasoning that it conflicted with the Chapter 11 policies of flexibility and equity in that
it focused on a single issue, i.e., whether
rejection was necessary to
1 8
prevent the debtor from liquidating. 1
The REA Express "business collapse" test may not, however,
conflict with the purpose of section 1113(e). Since interim changes
must be "essential to the continuation to the debtor's business" or
in order "to avoid irreparable damage to the estate," the court's
focus will be primarily on the debtor and not on other affected
parties. Thus, the central issue will be whether the debtor will liquidate absent the authorization of the interim changes. The interests of other affected parties may, however, be considered by the
court in the context of what might happen to them in the event
the interim changes are authorized and the application to reject
the collective-bargaining agreement is subsequently not granted."6 9
. The court should require the debtor to meet a stiff burden of
proof using sound and reliable financial information and projections.1 70 Ultimately, bona fide use of section 1113(e) will probably
occur when the debtor is near collapse and unable to negotiate proposed modifications quickly or to wait for the court to approve its
application to reject the collective-bargaining agreement.
H.

What Issues are Presented by the Timetables?

Subsections (d)(1) and (2)of section 1113 deal with the precise
timetables and the exceptions thereto, regarding the procedures
utilized in the rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement. Once
the debtor applies for rejection of the agreement, the court must
schedule a hearing within fourteen days after the date of the filing
of the application. 7 1 The court may extend the time for the comcut Celery Co., 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2847 (D. Conn. 1980).
168. See the discussion supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
169. See, e.g., In re Wright Air Lines, Inc., 44 Bankr. 744 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (section
1113 interim relief denied where: debtor presented incomplete financial information, unreliable financial projections, failed to estimate savings necessary to survive, debtor failed to
address the issue of what would occur in the event rejection of the collective-bargaining
agreement was not granted, debtor failed to show that the cost savings associated with the
program to be eliminated through interim relief was substantial, i.e., more than 10% of
debtor's monthly losses; court held debtor did not establish that the relief sought was essential to the continuation of the debtor either financially or administratively or that the failure to obtain relief would result in irreparable damage).
170. Id.
171. The Code provides:
Upon the filing of an application for rejection the court shall schedule a hearing to
be held not later than fourteen days after the date of the filing of such application.
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mencement of a hearing up to seven days, or for additional periods
to which the debtor and the employees' representative agree,
"where the circumstances of the case and the interests of justice
require such extension. "172 In addition, subsection (d)(1) requires
the debtor, or the clerk of courts, to give at least ten days notice to
173
all interested parties of the rejection hearing.
Subsection (d)(2) requires the court to rule upon this rejection
application within thirty days after the commencement of the
hearing. 17 4 The court may, however, "in the interest of justice" and
where "the trustee and the employees' representative . . . agree"
extend the time for a ruling. 175 If the court fails to rule on the
application within thirty days of the commencement of the court
hearing or of the agreed upon time extensions, the debtor may unilaterally terminate or alter any provisions of the collective-bargain17 6
ing agreement pending the court's ruling.
Since neither the House nor the Senate conferees give guidance
or direction to these various timetable provisions, some intriguing
issues are presented. For example, although 1113(d)(2) allows a
court-approved time extension for the hearing where "the trustee
and the employees' representative. . . agree," what happens if the
All interested parties may appear and be heard at such hearing. Adequate notice shall
be provided to such parties at least ten days before the date of such hearing. The
court may extend the time for the commencement of such hearing for a period not
exceeding seven days where the circumstances of the case, and the interests of justice
require such extension, or for additional periods of time to which the trustee and
representative agree.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d) (West Supp. 1985).
172. Id.
173. The phrase "all interested parties" has a broader meaning than that of "all affected parties." The latter term is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 77-83.
"All interested parties" would encompass parties who have no financial or contractual ties
to the debtor, but who are quite interested in the outcome. For example, "all interested
parties" may include the various creditor committees appointed by the court and their
counsel, the National Labor Relations Board, the national committees of the relevant unions, and the trustees of the affected health and welfare funds.
174. The Code provides:
The court shall rule on such application for rejection within thirty days after the date
of the commencement of the hearing. In the interests of justice, the court may extend
such time for ruling for such additional period as the trustee and the employees'
representative may agree to. If the court does not rule on such application within
thirty days after the date of the commencement of the hearing, or within such additional time as the trustee and the employees' representative may agree to, the trustee
may terminate or alter any provisions of the collective bargaining agreement pending
the ruling of the court on such application.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1113(d)(2) (West Supp. 1985).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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parties refuse to agree? From a practical standpoint, the possibility
that the parties will agree is small since, at this point, it is not
likely that the debtor and the employees' representative are on
speaking terms.
A related issue is presented where the court fails to render a decision within the thirty day prescribed time period and the debtor
and employee representative have not agreed to a time extension.
An additional issue arises where the court fails to rule within the
time prescribed, the debtor alters or modifies the existing collective-bargaining agreement and the court thereafter disallows the
rejection. Is the debtor obligated to pay the costs related to the
alteration or modification it may have implemented during this period? If the answer is in the affirmative, what priority would be
given to these costs,"" and how would non-economic alterations or
modifications be estimated? 7 8 These issues remain to be resolved
by future cases.

IV.

RELATED ISSUES

Three related issues will be addressed in this section. The first
two issues deal with whether either party can avoid having the section 1113 rejection issue heard by the bankruptcy court or even
heard at all; the third issue deals with both parties' legal duties
under the NLRA after the collective-bargaining agreement has
been rejected in accordance with section 1113.
A.

Is the Bankruptcy Court Constitutionally Permitted to
Make Binding Determinations Under Section 1113?

There may be circumstances where a party, such as a union,
desires that a matter be heard by a district court, instead of bringing it before what is perceived to be an unsympathetic bankruptcy
court. Such a party may argue that, under the Supreme Court's
ruling in Northern Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,' 7 e the
177. Representatives Hughes and Morrison indicated that if an application for rejection is denied by the court after a hearing on the merits, the employees should then be
entitled to any lost wages and benefits as an administrative expense. See 130 CONG. REc.
H7496 (statement of Rep. Morrison).
178. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
179. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). In Marathon, Northern Pipeline filed a petition for reorganization and subsequently, pursuant to the BRA of 1978, filed suit against Marathon in that
bankruptcy court seeking damages for alleged breach of contract, breach of warranty, misrepresentation, coercion and duress. Marathon filed a motion to dismiss the suit, which motion the bankruptcy judge denied. On appeal, however, the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota reversed and granted the motion. On direct appeal, the United
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bankruptcy court is not constitutionally permitted to make binding determinations concerning proposed rejections of collectivebargaining agreements in cases arising under Title 11.
In Marathon, the Supreme Court held that the bankruptcy
court's exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to the jurisdictional grant
under section 1471 of the BRA of 1978180 violated article III of the
Constitution when such jurisdiction was exercised over claims and
causes of action arising under state law.' The majority of the
Court reasoned that section 1471 granted "essential attributes" of
federal judicial powers to non-article III bankruptcy court judges
who lacked the article III protections of life tenure and protection
against salary diminution. 82 The majority also added that bankruptcy court judges could not adjudicate state-based claims either
alone as legislative courts' or as "adjuncts"''
to the required article III courts, i.e. those that perform statutorily defined fact find85
ing functions concerning a particularized area of the law.1
States Supreme Court affirmed in a six-three decision.
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(a) (1982).
181. The two concurring Justices emphasized that the Court's holding should be restricted to the bankruptcy court's power to adjudicate claims or causes of action arising
under or based on state law, there being no need to decide the constitutionality of the jurisdictional grant of other article III judicial powers. 458 U.S. 50, 89-92 (1982).
182. Id. at 59-63.
183. The plurality stated that since bankruptcy courts did not fall within the historically recognized exceptions to article III, e.g., "territorial courts," court-martial courts or
courts created by Congress to adjudicate cases involving "public rights," Congress was
barred by article III from establishing legislative courts empowered to exercise jurisdiction
over all matters related to those arising under the bankruptcy laws. Id. at 63-76.
184. Id. at 76-87. The Court listed five reasons underlying its determination that the
bankruptcy court was exercising powers far greater than those lodged in the adjuncts previously approved by the Supreme Court: (1) the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction was not limited to specialized, narrowly confined factual determinations about a particularized area of law but reached beyond traditional matters of bankruptcy to include civil
proceedings arising in or related to cases under Title 11; (2) its jurisdiction was not limited
to "statutorily channeled facting functions" but included the jurisdiction conferred by the
BRA of 1978 upon the district courts; (3) its power to issue orders was not limited to certain'
types of orders issued pursuant to specialized procedures and enforceable only by order of
the district court; rather, its power included all the ordinary powers of the district courts;
(4) the scope of review applicable to its orders was not whether such orders were "supported
by the evidence" but whether its orders met the more differential "clearly erroneous" standard; and (5) its judgments were not required by law to be enforced by the district court;
rather, they were final and binding. Id.
185. Justice White, in his dissenting opinion (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell), argued that if section 1471 was unconstitutional, it should not have been held
unconstitutional on its face but only as applied to the claim against Marathon because "only
a tiny fraction" of the cases a bankruptcy judge handles deal with state-law claims, the rest
being adjudications and discharges in bankruptcy which are matters of federal law. Id. at
94-96.
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The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, although not section 1113, was a congressional response to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Marathon.186 It is submitted that in
the context of section 1113, the constitutionality test of Marathon
is not relevant because Marathon dealt with the power of the
bankruptcy judge to adjudicate claims or causes of action arising
under or based on state law. Since rejection of an executory collective-bargaining agreement is a matter arising under federal law,
specifically 11 U.S.C. § 1113, it is not based on a cause of action
18 7
arising under state law.
Since the Marathon decision is applicable to the Act, if the Act
is found unconstitutional, it should be held unconstitutional as applied, rather than on its face. The Act deals with a variety of subjects, e.g., rejection of nonresidential leases, of time-sharing agreements and of collective-bargaining agreements, and exempting
186. 130 CONG. REC. H7489 (statement of Rep. Rodino), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 576; 130 CONG. REC. H7492 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 579; 130 CONG. REc. S8887
(statement of Sen. Thurmond), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at
584; 130 CONG. REC. S8889 (statement of Sen. Dole), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, supra note 61, at 587; 130 CONG. REC. S8891 (statement of Sen. Hatch), reprintedin
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, supra note 61, at 590, 606.
Under the Act, the district court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
under Title 11 and original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising
under Title 11 or arising under or relating to a case under Title 11. (Section 101 of the Act,
amending 28 U.S.C. § 1334). If the district court provides that such cases are to be referred
to the bankruptcy judges for the district, 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (1982), the bankruptcy judges,
in dealing with such references, may hear and determine "all cases under Title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title 11" and may enter
appropriate orders and judgments. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1). The bankruptcy court judge
must determine, on the judge's own motion or on timely motion of a party, whether a proceeding is a core proceeding, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), or one otherwise related to
a case under Title 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
The district court retains the following powers concerning referral: it may withdraw a
reference on its own motion or on timely motion by any party for "good cause shown," 28
U.S.C. § 157(d); it must withdraw a reference, on timely motion of a party, if resolution of
the referred proceeding requires consideration of "both Title 11 and other laws of the
United States," id.; it must enter a final order or judgment, in certain non-core proceedings
related to a case under Title 11, after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any party has timely
and specifically objected, 28 U.S.C. § 157(c); and it must hear appeals from final judgments,
orders and decrees of the bankruptcy court judges, id. § 158(a) through (d).
187. Since a bankruptcy judge's determinations concerning section 1113 occur in cases
brought under Title 11, such determinations are within section 157(b)(1)'s language "all
cases under Title 11." Such determinations do not fall under the section 157(b)(1) language
"core proceedings," since proposed rejections of labor contracts are not specifically enumerated as one of those core proceedings. See generally the discussion in the immediately preceding note. See also infra note 194.
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from discharge under Chapter 7 debts arising from a judgment or
consent decree entered in a court of record in which liability was
incurred as a result of the debtor having been a drunk driver. 188 It
is not solely devoted to the creation and jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts.
If the "as applied" test is used and the Marathon decision is
relevant to the bankruptcy court's determinations under section
1113, then it is suggested that the bankruptcy court is an adjunct
to the district court for purposes of section 1113 determinations.
It is arguable that the bankruptcy court exercises power under
section 1113 greater than those exercised by adjuncts previously
approved by the Supreme Court. 189 For example, a bankruptcy
court's powers are not limited to statutorily channeled fact-finding
functions, but include the power to make final and enforceable orders and decrees regarding section 1113 applications to reject. 19
On the other hand, the bankruptcy court's subject matter jurisdiction is limited to a traditional matter of federal bankruptcy law,
i.e., rejection of executory contracts. Also, the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction is much more restricted than that conferred by the Act
on the district courts, in that the district court has the power to
withdraw the referred matter, to review de novo certain proceedings and to hear all appeals.' 9 '
The constitutionality issue would probably be presented in the
context of a party arguing that the district court must withdraw
the case from the bankruptcy court because the resolution of the
bankruptcy proceeding requires consideration of both title 11 and
another law of the United States, i.e., article III of the United
States Constitution. 92 In any event, until the Supreme Court finally resolves this issue, the district court may be required much
more frequently to "determine" section 1113 issues. The Supreme
Court's decision in Marathon should not be applicable to section
1113. If it is held to be so, whether the statute will withstand constitutional muster will ultimately be a matter for judicial
resolution. 93
188. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 365(c)(3), (d)(3), (4); 365(h), (i); 523(a)(9).
189. See supra note 184.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See supra note 186.
193. Two constitutional issues beyond the scope of this article focus on whether the
bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction over "core" and "non-core" proceedings is unconstitutional in that the bankruptcy court is empowered to determine state-law based claims
required by Marathon to be determined by article III courts. For example, "core" proceed-
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Can The Debtor Avoid Section 1113?

Section 1113 is not applicable, by its terms, to a liquidation proceeding under Chapter 7.19" Under Chapter 7, the trustee must decide whether to assume or reject the executory contract within
sixty days after the order for relief.1 95 A question which the conferees did not address is whether the debtor can avoid section 1113 by
voluntarily filing under Chapter 7 and having a trustee appointed
who would reject (or not accept) the collective-bargaining agreement within sixty days, and then convert the proceeding to one
under Chapter 11.196 While this hypothetical situation presupposes
a "friendly," cooperative trustee who would willingly do the above,
it may enable the debtor to unilaterally reject its collective-bargaining agreement without risking bankruptcy court disapproval of
its petition to reject and/or an NLRB unfair labor practice charge.
A debtor contemplating the above action should be advised that
the potential costs may outweigh the perceived benefits. In this situation, the union might perceive the debtor's actions to be
designed to strip the union of its section 1113 protections, and,
predictably, would exercise every economic and political muscle it
had against such a debtor-employer. Also, since the Supreme Court
in Bildisco made clear that, after rejection, the parties had to comply with the NLRA provisions to bargain in good faith until impasse, the debtor will have to deal with a now hostile, and perhaps
militant, union in a negotiation context. Thus, what appears to be
ings include, among other things, proceedings to recover fraudulent transfers, even though
such proceedings could be brought under state law in the absence of a bankruptcy case. 28
U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H). "Core" proceedings also include the bankrupt estate's counterclaims
against persons having filed claims, even though such counterclaims are based on causes of
action under state law. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C). "Non-core" proceedings, such as state law based
in personam claims, can be asserted by a trustee or a debtor against third parties.
The Act sets forth no standard by which the district court reviews, on appeal, the bankruptcy court's actions in either "core" or "non-core" proceedings, except for a de novo review in a "non-core" context when a party timely and specifically objects. See supra note
186. Also, since there is no requirement that the district court conduct further hearings, the
district court's standard of review appears to be the "clearly erroneous" standard in both
core and non-core proceedings. See Bankruptcy Rule 5013. The bankruptcy court can issue
final orders and the district court's scope of review of the bankruptcy court's action, except
in a specific instance, is not a de novo review, so that definite attributes of judicial power
appear to be vested in the bankruptcy court with respect to its determinations on core as
well as non-core proceedings which may be violative of the Marathon rule. See generally
Miller & Bienenstock, Bankruptcy Restructuring Promises Few Reforms, LEGAL TIMES,
July 30, 1984, at 30.
194. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-766 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
195. Id. § 365(d), as amended by the Act.
196. Id. § 706.
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a miracle drug may have disastrous side effects.
C.

Following Section 1113 Rejection, What are the Employer's
and the Union's Legal Duties?

After the collective-bargaining agreement has been rejected in
accordance with section 1113, what are the employer's and union's
rights and obligations under applicable labor laws? While the conferees did not address this issue, the Supreme Court made clear in
Bildisco that, although a rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement was not a unilateral mid-term modification or termination so
as to constitute an unfair labor practice,19 7 the requirements of the
NLRA were preserved in all other respects. 198
In a non-Chapter 11 situation, sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the
NLRA 19 9 prohibit an employer2 00 from making any mid-term modifications 0 1 of the express terms of the collective-bargaining agreement prior to its expiration without the union's consent. Under
both sections, an employer must ordinarily bargain in good faith to
"impasse" with the union before implementing changes in terms
and conditions of employment which were not expressly covered
by the written terms of the collective-bargaining agreement or consciously discussed during negotiation of such agreement. 2 2 The
duty to bargain until "impasse" has been defined as the duty to
bargain on mandatory subjects of negotiation2 0 3 in "exhaustive
good faith negotiations" until the parties have reached "irreconcil197. Supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
198. Id.
199. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (reproduced in its entirety, supra note 37), which provides, in
part, that mid-term modifications are prohibited unless the party complies with the notice
and "cooling off" provisions of section 158(d)(1)-(4).
200. The term "employer" is defined broadly in 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) as "any person
acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly," with the exception of governmental entities and "any person subject to the Railway Labor Act." See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164
(1982).
201. H. K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1969); NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l
Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960). Cf. Milwaukee Spring, Div. Of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268
NLRB No. 87 (1984) (NLRB held that because a collective-bargaining agreement did not
expressly prohibit the transfer of bargaining unit work, the employer was not required to
obtain union's consent before transferring it).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (reproduced in its entirety, supra note 37). One should be
aware that industry practice is such that the duty to bargain to impasse on such subjects is
frequently precluded by a "zipper" or "wrap-up" clause. Under such a clause, both parties
waive the right to raise those subjects not expressly covered by the written terms of the
agreement or explicitly discussed during the negotiations.
203. For a definition of mandatory subjects, see supra note 90. Cf. NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).

978

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:939

able differences. 20 4 The employer cannot unilaterally impose requirements concerning terms and conditions of employment until
after such bargaining. If the employer does so, his actions may constitute an unfair labor practice. 20 5 Finally, the employer retains the
exclusive authority to make fundamental business decisions, such
as partial or total termination of operations, and has no duty
under either section 8(a)(5) or 8(d) to bargain about them, unless
such decisions were expressly covered by the collective-bargaining
20 s
agreement.
The incentives to comply with the NLRA are both legal and
practical. From a legal standpoint, both the employer and union
are required to comply with the NLRA under the Bildisco decision
and, indeed, by the NLRA. Thus, even if the collective-bargaining
agreement was properly rejected under section 1113 and there is no
contract as of the rejection date, 07 both parties must bargain
under section 8(a)(5) to impasse concerning terms and conditions
of employment. Only after an impasse is reached, no unfair labor
practice is committed and a strike results, would the debtor be free
to permanently replace the striking union employees under differ2 08
ent, unbargained-for terms and conditions of employment.
Practically speaking, without an agreement as to terms and conditions of employment, the law of the shop could be the "law of
the jungle." There would be no agreement on, for example, allocation of overtime or work assignments, processing of grievances,
204. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); Fetzer Television, Inc. v. NLRB, 317 F.2d
420 (6th Cir. 1962).
205. See, e.g., Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (employer
must bargain with union over decision to subcontract bargaining-unit work); University of
Chicago v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 942, 949 (7th Cir. 1975) (unless work transfers "are specifically
prohibited by the bargaining agreement, an employer is free to transfer work out of the
bargaining unit if ... the employer complies with Fibreboard . . .by bargaining in good
faith to impasse").
206. First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1980) (Court said
that Congress did not expect that the "elected union representative would become an equal
partner in the running of the business enterprise").
207. Briggs Transp. Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 739 F.2d 341 (8th
Cir. 1984) (union employees did strike after debtor rejected collective-bargaining agreement
pursuant to section 365).
208. If the employer does not comply with its section 8(a)(5) obligation to negotiate in
good faith until impasse and a strike occurs, the strike could be deemed an "unfair labor
practice" strike instead of an "economic strike." Under the first scenario, the substitute
hirees would be employed only temporarily, as the employer would be required, when the
strike is resolved, to reinstate the former union employees with back pay. Under the second
situation, the substitute hirees would be permanent replacements, and except for the
union's limited recall rights, the employer would not have a duty to reinstate them with
back pay.
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prohibition of work stoppages or strikes, etc. Thus, the most minor
dispute could result in decreased productivity as evidenced by reduced quantity and quality of production, physical altercations
among employees or between management and employees, work
stoppages and strikes, 20 9 all of which could be the death knell of
the employer's attempt to successfully reorganize.
Assuming no valid unfair labor practice claim exists, a union's
economic or social power in this situation depends on the circumstances. Where the employer's labor force is relatively unskilled
and/or where an available potential labor pool of employees who
do not fear the social badge of "scab" exists, the union may have
little economic or social power, including the potential economic
pressure of a work slow-down or a strike, to do anything but accept
the debtor's proposal. If such a union struck after impasse, the
debtor could hire-without any significant set-back in its reorganization efforts-permanent replacements, subject to the union's
limited recall rights.
Where, however, the labor force is relatively skilled, educated
and knowledgeable in the employer's product or service and in the
procedures the employer deems appropriate to follow, and/or the
social stigma of being called "scab" is a significant deterrent, the
union's economic and social power is significantly greater. In such
circumstances, the current work force and not a substitute work
force is often key to the employer's successful Chapter 11 reorganization. If such a union struck, and the debtor hired permanent
replacements, the debtor's reorganization efforts would be seriously impeded.
Consequently, in most situations, both the employer and the
union have both legal duties and practical incentives to negotiate a
new agreement before impasse is reached. They also have incentives to agree to be governed by those provisions of the "old" contract not modified under a section 1113 proposal. Since the rights
and obligations provided for under the labor laws are not substantially affected by a section 1113 rejection, the union and debtor
may query, after the agreement has been rejected and a strike occurs, whether the agreement was, with the benefit of hindsight, really that burdensome.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Section 1113 of the Act was a congressional response to the Su209.

In re C. & W. Mining Co., 38 Bankr. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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preme Court's ruling in Bildisco. It reflected Congress's concern
over the legitimate needs of both the debtor-employer and the
union. Usually, the employer must cut costs drastically to permit a
successful reorganization. Frequently, labor-related costs guaranteed by the collective-bargaining agreement (i.e., salaries, benefits,
etc.), are a significant portion of the debtor's costs. Prior to the
enactment of section 1113, a debtor's unilateral rejection of the executory collective-bargaining agreement was a permitted procedure. Under the Supreme Court's reasoning in the Bildisco decision, an unfair labor practice did not occur as a result of such
rejection. The unions, therefore, were virtually powerless against
this type of action.
Only after the passage of section 1113 were the unions guaranteed, for the most part, that a defined, two-step process must be
followed by the debtor in order to reject a collective-bargaining
agreement in the context of a Chapter 11 reorganization.
Only after the passage of section 1113 were the unions given a
statutory basis for demanding compliance with the first step, i.e., a
debtor's proposal, based on the most complete and reliable information at the time, providing only for those "necessary" modifications in the employees' benefits and protections that are "necessary" to permit the reorganization of the debtor and assuring that
all creditors, the debtor and all affected parties, including the
union, are treated fairly and equitably.
Only after the passage of section 1113 were the unions assured
that a court would deny the application for rejection unless all of
the step-one procedures were not met, the union refused to accept
the proposal without good cause, and the balance of the equities
clearly favored rejection.
Only after section 1113 were the unions confidently informed
that unilateral modifications would be permitted as interim relief
in limited circumstances for a time certain.
Indeed, section 1113 may force both the debtor and union to resolve their differences and cooperatively participate in a meaningful exchange at an earlier stage of the bankruptcy, thereby enhancing the chances of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization, and
avoiding the occurrence of a Chapter 7 liquidation. Is the pendulum swinging against labor? After Bildisco, it might have been; after the passage of section 1113, it is not.

